In late February, as Russian artillery thundered against Ukrainian positions in Donetsk and Luhansk, Kalashnikovs rattled amidst frost-encrusted forests, and cruise missiles whizzed through the air to rain down on Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa, one could hear the overture of a very different chorus in Sweden and Finland. Whether in the halls of power in Stockholm and Helsinki or among citizens at dinner tables and on social media, a rising push for membership in NATO could be clearly heard.
Russia has been engaged in Ukraine since 2014, fighting a thinly-veiled proxy war that, while drawing NATO support for Ukraine in the form of advisors and technical expertise, did little to impact the defense posture of its members. The protracted conflict drew even less interest in Europe's neutral nations, whether Austria, Sweden, or Ireland. However, the Russian Federation's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine produced an entirely different response. The invasion induced a comprehensive reevaluation of defense and economic policy towards Moscow, regardless of prior interest. Unlike previous conflicts that drew a NATO response, this reevaluation was embraced by Finland and Sweden, who further discarded their veneer of total neutrality to emphatically emphasize their record of cooperation and defense integration with the Western Bloc. Fundamentally, this volte-face from Stockholm and Helsinki was a realpolitik-inflected choice induced by Moscow's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and refusal to engage as a peaceful actor.
Despite the swiftness with which Sweden was formally incorporated into NATO, such an outcome would not have been imagined several months ago. Sweden, an informal NATO partner since the end of the Cold War, has long maintained its tradition of neutrality. Following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden adopted a formal policy of neutrality, which it would maintain through both World Wars. Throughout the Cold War, Sweden embraced a more internationalist tact, contributing substantially to UN peacekeeping missions and engaging in vocal advocacy against American and Soviet interventionism.
Considering Sweden's legacy of formal neutrality, there had to have been a dramatic change that catalyzed its turn towards NATO. Sweden previously believed it would be most secure by reserving the option to join NATO but refraining from doing so. Stockholm largely believed that this approach would enable it to maintain excellent ties with the West—through the EU, values sharing, and informal defense partnerships—while developing amicable relations with Moscow. Further, Stockholm understood (until very recently) that Russia wished to curtail NATO enlargement by keeping tensions relatively low in Scandinavia. Therefore, from the vantage point of Swedish politicians and diplomats, Moscow would be hesitant to engage in potentially escalatory operations in Europe's north. However, given that the Kremlin is bolder than ever—for Putin has little to lose and considers confrontation with the West inevitable—Russia has essentially forced Sweden to seek out the only surefire deterrent: NATO membership.
Finland has a more complex past than Sweden. Ruled by Sweden from approximately 1250 until 1809, it subsequently became the Grand Duchy of Finland, part of the Russian Empire. Finland saw the beginnings of a nationalist movement in the mid-19th century, yet statehood would only come after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Finland would fight two bloody wars against the Soviet Union: the Winter War and the Continuation War. Following WWII, Finland signed the Pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which limited Finnish autonomy in international relations, outlining a foreign policy that would later come to be known as "Finlandization." Despite Soviet influence throughout the Cold War, Finland maintained a capitalist economy and later joined the Nordic Council and the European Union.
While Finland maintained its policy of "Finlandization" throughout the Cold War (only to see it become a pejorative), the post-Cold War world is now fundamentally less stable for neutral nations. Lacking the carrots (and many sticks) of a bipolar world, countries not fully integrated into the Western rules-based order have been increasingly exposed to the violent whims of a revanchist regime in Moscow that wishes to fill its much-too-large Cold War shoes again. Furthermore, Helsinki recognized the Kremlin's impatience with the nations to which it lays claim that are willing to defy Moscow. While Finland is neither Georgia nor Ukraine, it does not seem entirely impossible that Putin would act in a similar way toward Helsinki absent Article 5 guarantees. In all, NATO is the key to keeping Finland safe without having to defer to the antagonistic demands of an unfriendly power.
Swedish and Finnish public opinion swung quickly to support NATO membership in the weeks and months following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and their respective parliaments passed legislation in favor of membership. However, a significant obstacle quickly arose: Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the autocratically-inclined President of Turkey, announced that Ankara would be blocking Swedish and Finnish accession into the alliance due to their alleged support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or the PKK, whom Ankara labels as terrorists. While the PKK actively recruits in Sweden from a large emigrant Kurdish population, Erdogan's inhibition of the accession process had entirely different motives, as both Sweden and Finland already recognize the group as terrorists. Quite simply, stonewalling the process enabled Ankara to project power within NATO to further national objectives. Erdogan recognizes that NATO would never risk angering Turkey to the point where it would leave the alliance (nor would it want to), but he can play NATO's consensus voting system to gain promises from the US and other critical allies. In all, when Turkey backed down on June 28th, it came as no shock to many in the foreign policy establishment. The US had to assuage Ankara with promises of fighter jets, Sweden and Finland had to agree to do something they were already doing, and membership was suddenly acceptable.
NATO derives tremendous benefits from Swedish and Finnish membership. NATO's deterrence capabilities are bolstered by expansion in three main ways. First, membership fundamentally eliminates Moscow's ability to act ambiguously around the Baltic Sea by threatening conflict should NATO expand. Fortunately, this time around, Brussels called the Kremlin's bluff and prevented an adverse outcome. By reducing Russian strategic ambiguity, provocative measures in the region become definitionally escalatory. Insofar as Moscow can be certain that it would meet a harsh NATO response, Article 5 will continue to provide a robust deterrent.
Second, NATO expansion enables the alliance to engage more deeply in two critical regions: the Arctic and the Baltic Sea. In the past decade, Russia has become increasingly involved in the Arctic, stationing forces there, growing its fleet of icebreakers, and positioning itself to exploit rare-Earth minerals as the ice begins to melt. Swedish and Finnish membership both validates and inherently grows the NATO mission in the Arctic, putting at the alliance's disposal two militaries well-adapted to fighting in the far North. In the Baltic Sea, NATO can consolidate control of the Danish Straits, add two capable navies to its already-impressive naval arm, and acquire further strategic positioning in the North Baltic on Gotland. Overall, NATO emerges far better prepared to combat Russia on its doorstep.
Finally, Swedish and Finnish entry into NATO prevents Russia from acting directly against Scandinavia absent security guarantees. Stockholm and Helsinki otherwise would risk a repeat of Russian belligerence in Ukraine, especially considering the expansionist and revanchist rhetoric most recently spewed by the Kremlin. Russia has recently built up its forces on the Finnish border, overflown Gotland, and cyberattacked Sweden. Extending Article 5 effectively deters Moscow and therefore prevents any possibility of Russian expansion into the heart of Europe.
Beyond the practical considerations of deterrence and reducing Moscow's escalatory pathways, expanding NATO to include Sweden and Finland has broader implications. Sweden and Finland are thriving democracies that embody NATO's Article 2, whether by engaging in advocacy through global institutions, contributing to peacekeeping operations, or developing thriving democratic institutions at home. Both the actions taken and the propagandized rhetoric spouted by Vladimir Putin's regime firmly suggest that rapprochement with Moscow is entirely impossible; Russia is undeniably an enemy of the West and liberal democracy. Therefore, Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO is vital; for their security, the defense of liberal ideals, and, in due time, the vanquishing of autocracy and despotism in all its malodorous forms.
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